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Abstract
Background: There is considerable interest at present in exploring the potential of social health insurance to
increase access to and affordability of health care in Africa. A number of countries are currently experimenting
with different approaches. Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was passed into law in 2003 but
fully implemented from late 2005. It has already reached impressive coverage levels. This article aims to provide
a preliminary assessment of the NHIS to date. This can inform the development of the NHIS itself but also other
innovations in the region.
Methods: This article is based on analysis of routine data, on secondary literature and on key informant
interviews conducted by the authors with stakeholders at national, regional and district levels over the period of
2005 to 2009.
Results: In relation to its financing sources, the NHIS is heavily reliant on tax funding for 70–75% of its revenue.
This has permitted quick expansion of coverage, partly through the inclusion of large exempted population
groups. Card holders increased from 7% of the population in 2005 to 45% in 2008. However, only around a third
of these are contributing to the scheme financially. This presents a sustainability problem, in that revenue is de-
coupled from the growing membership. In addition, the NHIS offers a broad benefits package, with no co-
payments and limited gate-keeping, and also faces cost escalation related to its new payment system and the
growing utilisation of members. These features contributed to a growth in distressed schemes and failure to pay
outstanding facility claims in 2008.
The NHIS has had a considerable impact on the health system as a whole, taking on a growing role in funding
curative care. In 2009, it is expected to contribute 41% of the overall resource envelope. However there is
evidence that this funding is not additional but has been switched from other funding channels. There are some
equity concerns about this, as the new funding source (a VAT-based tax) may be more regressive. In addition,
membership of the NHIS at present has a pro-rich bias, and a pro-urban bias in relation to renewals. Only a very
small proportion is registered as indigent, and there is some evidence of 'squeezing out' of non-members from
health care utilisation. Finally, considerable challenges remain in relation to strengthening the purchasing role of
the NHIS, and also settling debates about its structure and accountability.
Conclusion: Some trade-offs will be necessary between the existing wide benefits package of the NHIS and the
laudable desire to reach universal coverage. The overall resource envelope for health is likely to be stable rather
than increasing over the medium-term. In the longer term, the investment costs in the NHIS will only be justified
if it is able to increase the cost-effectiveness of purchasing and the responsiveness of the system as a whole.
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In the light of the Millennium Development Goal targets
for health gains and poverty reductions, there is a growing
impetus towards providing universal coverage of health
services [1], meaning that all of the population has access
to appropriate health care when needed, and at an afford-
able cost. One important measure to increase affordability
is to reduce the out-of-pocket payments which users make
for health care. These are widely recognised as creating a
barrier to access, especially in poorer countries, and as
pushing households further into poverty [2].
Social health insurance is seen as one of the health financ-
ing approaches with a strong potential to share risks
across population groups and time. As membership is
mandatory, it avoids many of the problems of adverse
selection which smaller, voluntary health insurance
schemes face. Until recently, there were few large-scale
social health insurance schemes operating in sub-Saharan
Africa (ones which extended beyond smaller groups of
formal sector workers, such as civil servants). Over the
past decade, however, experiments in social health insur-
ance have been springing up in a number of African coun-
tries, including Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Ghana [3]. As these schemes are still young and evolving,
few have yet been systematically evaluated.
The National Health Insurance Act (Act 650) was passed
into law in Ghana in 2003, though implementation (in
terms of access to benefits) began in autumn of 2005. At
four years old, it is timely to assess its evolution and per-
formance to date. This article examines the design of the
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana and
the evidence to date of its impact, both on members and
on the health system as a whole. The NHIS has seen a
rapid increase in membership during the first four years of
its life. We examine how well is it performing against its
overall objectives, and what lessons it can provide for the
region.
The NHIS in Ghana grew out of an election promise made
in 2000 by the incoming New Patriotic Party to abolish
user fees (traditionally known in Ghana as 'cash and
carry') [4]. These have constituted a well-documented bar-
rier to health care in Ghana since the 1980s, and attempts
to alleviate them with a system of exemptions have not
been very successful [5-7]. As a proportion of total public
sector funding, user fees constituted 13–14% in 2005 [8].
Act 650 and the subsequent Legislative Instrument (LI
1809) of 2004 do not specify the goals of the policy, but
the original focus from the party manifesto was clearly on
removing financial barriers to utilisation of health care.
During the 1990s, a number of mutual health organisa-
tions (MHOs) developed in Ghana, with some external
funding and technical support. Most MHOs focussed on
providing financial protection against the potentially cat-
astrophic costs of a limited range of inpatient services [9].
The NHIS aimed to build on these organisations by intro-
ducing district-based mutual health insurance schemes
(DMHIS).
The main features of the NHIS in Ghana are summarised
in Table 1. It was designed as a mandatory health insur-
ance system, with risk pooling across district schemes,
funded from members' contributions and a levy on the
value-added tax (VAT) charged on goods and services,
from which a broad minimum package of care could be
funded.
Methods
This article is based mainly on analysis of routine data
reported in the Government of Ghana Budget Statements,
Ministry of Health Financial Statements, NHIA reports,
and annual health sector reviews. The chief comparison is
between the situation in 2006 – the first full year of oper-
ation of the NHIS – and 2008 – the latest year for which
some data are available. The data sources are analysed the-
matically, focussing on all of the main areas of concern for
insurance schemes – coverage levels, revenues, cost com-
ponents, and expenditures.
This is supplemented by two sources: a review of pub-
lished and grey literature on the NHIS, and insights
derived from semi-structured key informant interviews.
These were conducted as part of annual health sector
reviews in 2006, 2007 and 2009. The questions focussed
on the implementation of the NHIS, its impact on key
stakeholders and its sustainability. Informants were cho-
sen purposively based on their positions and knowledge.
They included representatives of the Ministry of Health,
the Ministry of Finance, the NHIA, the Ghana Health Serv-
ice, district schemes, development partners, non-govern-
mental organisations, health facilities, and health
managers at regional and district levels. In 2006 and 2007,
19 key informants were interviewed; in 2009 the number
was 35.
Results
Funding sources
For most social health insurance (SHI) models, the prin-
cipal source of funding is earmarked contributions by
employees and their employers, civil servants and govern-
ment (as their employer), and the self-employed from the
formal and informal sectors of the economy. Hybrid
forms of SHI are also quite prevalent, with government
paying contributions for those, such as the unemployed
and the poor, who would otherwise have difficulties in
contributing. However, its distinct feature is that it does
not call exclusively on public finance, but instead spreadsPage 2 of 13
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Table 1: Main features of Ghana NHIS
Feature Description
Funding National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) established to pay for:
▪ Subsidies to schemes
▪ Reinsurance for schemes
▪ Cost of enrolling the indigent
▪ Supporting access to health care
Funds to come from:
▪ National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) – 2.5% of V.A.T.
▪ Payroll deductions (2.5% of income) for formal sector
▪ employees
▪ Other funds voted by Parliament, income from investments, any donations, or loans
In addition, DHMIS will raise funds from premia for informal sector members, to be set by agreement with the National 
Health Insurance Authority (NHIA)
Membership Membership is mandatory (either via the DHMIS or a private insurance policy). Formal sector workers have involuntary 
payroll deductions (SSNIT contributions). Informal sector are charged premia which should be income-related. Initially, 
there is a six-month gap between joining and being eligible for benefits.
Exemptions Some groups will be exempt from paying for membership (originally SSNIT pensioners, over-70s, under-18s where both 
parents are members; indigents). The NHIA will transfer subsidies to cover the cost of their enrolment. An indigent is 
defined as someone who meets four criteria:
▪ is unemployed and has no visible source of income;
▪ does not have a fixed place of residence according to standards determined by the scheme;
▪ does not live with a person who is employed and who has a fixed place of residence; and
▪ does not have any identifiable consistent support from another person.
Benefits package All providers must offer a minimum package, which is specified and broad. National Health Insurance Drug List is 
established. 95% of all health care is covered – all services are included other than: rehabilitation other than physiotherapy; 
appliances and prostheses; cosmetic surgery; HIV retroviral drugs; assisted reproduction; echocardiography; photography; 
angiography; orthoptics; kidney dialysis; heart and brain surgery other than those resulting from accidents; cancer treatment 
other than cervical and breast cancer; organ transplantation; non-listed drugs; treatment abroad; medical examinations for 
visas etc.; VIP wards; and mortuary services.
Eligible providers All providers are eligible, once accredited. Accreditation is reviewed every five years. Quarterly reports to be sent to the 
NHIC by providers.
Providers are to be paid within four weeks of claim being made to DMHIS.
Organisation National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) established to regulate the market, including accreditation of providers, 
agreeing contribution rates with schemes, resolving disputes, managing the NHIF, and approving cards.
Each district to have a DMHIS (with a minimum of 2,000 members). Benefits to be transferable across district schemes. Each 
DHMIS to submit annual reports to NHIA and to undertake annual audit of accounts.
Private MHIS not eligible for subsidies from NHIA.
Accountability National Health Insurance Council (NHIC) established to oversee NHIA and licence schemes (every two years). Includes 
representatives of main stakeholder groups, such as Ministry of Health, Ghana Health Services, regulatory bodies, 
consumers, and Executive Secretary of the NHIA. Chair and Executive Secretary appointed by the President.
NHIC proposes formula for allocation of funds to Parliament for annual approval, and provides annual report to Parliament 
on its use of funds.
Each DHMIS governed by a Board.
Rules established for handling complaints against providers or schemes.
Source: summarised from Act 650 (2003) and LI 1809 (2004)
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holds and the private sector as well [3].
In the case of Ghana, the NHIA is predominantly financed
from taxation (the hypothecated NHIL, described in Table
1), which constitutes an estimated 70–75% of total reve-
nue, with a further 20–25% coming from formal sector
contributions and only around 5% from informal sector
premia (according to NHIA financial reports). This makes
it less distinctly different from the traditional funding
mechanisms (government budgets, donor funding and
user fees), at least in terms of revenue generation. This sit-
uation may be exacerbated if, as promised during its elec-
tion manifesto, the current NDC government shifts to a
'one-time payment' conferring life membership (presum-
ably for the informal sector alone). This will further erode
the notion that the NHIS is a contribution-based insur-
ance system.
Coverage
Membership of the NHIS is legally mandatory (unless
alternative private health insurance can be demon-
strated); however, in practice membership is optional for
non-formal sector workers (the bulk of the population).
The growth of membership has nevertheless been impres-
sive – with card-holders rising from 6.6% of the popula-
tion in 2005 to 45% three years later in 2008 (figure 1).
This compares very favourably with many other schemes
– in Tanzania, for example, total enrolment in the new
SHI Benefit scheme is reported to be covering less than 1%
of the population [10].
The variation across regions is high, however, ranging
from 13% membership in Central Region to 70% in
Upper West in 2008. These variations relate in part to pre-
vious patterns of health insurance membership (Brong
Ahafo, for example, had many schemes in operation prior
to the NHIS being established and remains a 'high per-
former'). Greater Accra has a relatively low membership
(32%), related perhaps to greater difficulties enrolling an
urban population and a higher ability to pay out-of-
pocket for care.
The NHIA does not break down its card-holders by cate-
gory of member but does provide this information for
'registrants' (a larger group comprising those who have
expressed interest in joining, and who have paid some or
all of their premia, as well as those who are actually hold-
ing valid cards). The evolution in registrants is shown in
Table 2. It indicates which groups have fuelled the growth
in membership: the formal sector, as would be expected,
has not increased much over the past three years and only
comprises 3% of registrants in 2008. By contrast, informal
sector registrants have grown from 3% to 16% of the pop-
ulation. Another category which has seen a large increase
has been the children of members (this group is exempt),
Proportion of NHIS card-holders, by region, 2005 & 2008Figure 1
Proportion of NHIS card-holders, by region, 2005 & 2008. Source: analysis of data presented in annual health sector 
reviews for 2005 and 2008.
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from just under 4% of the population to 1% in 2008.
The vast majority of NHIS registrants, in 2005 and in
2008, are exempt from making any financial contribu-
tion. In this context, it is less surprising that the rate of
growth of membership has been so high. In 2005 28% of
registrants were contributors (via payroll or informal sec-
tor premia). This had risen to 36% in 2008, but this is still
only around a third of the total. Large population groups
are entitled to free care and this entitlement is being
extended. In July 2008 all pregnant women were offered a
free annual membership. In 2009 there are plans to
extend this to all children (decoupling them from paren-
tal membership, which was required in the original Act).
While this is positive from a universal coverage perspec-
tive, it does present challenges for sustainability (dis-
cussed below), and also adds to questions of the extent to
which the NHIS is a contributions-based insurance model
(Table 3).
Equity
In terms of the equity impact of the switch in funding
sources, this has not been investigated in depth. However,
generally speaking V.A.T.-based taxation (which is the
main funding source for the NHIS) is regressive, as poorer
households often have a limited ability to reduce their
consumption of taxed goods. By comparison, the general
taxation (based on personal and other taxes) which it has
substituted for is mildly progressive in Ghana [12].
In relation to benefits, although membership of the NHIS
should be universal, in practice there are many barriers to
joining – economic, geographic, organizational, and cul-
tural – and so membership remains partial and in some
ways skewed against marginalised groups.
While the premium for informal sector members is low
(around $5 per person per year), there is also an enrol-
ment fee ($1.5 for all except pregnant women), which
together are sufficient to deter many on low incomes. In
Table 2: NHIS registrants, by category, 2006 & 2008
2005 2008
Membership categories Number of registrants Proportion of total 
population
Number of registrants Proportion of total 
population
Formal sector 468,092 2.24% 811,567 3%
Informal sector 615,450 2.94% 3,727,454 16%
Paying members 1,083,542 5.18% 4,539,021 19.25%
Pensioners 43,208 0.21% 71,147 0.30%
Children 1,751,175 8.37% 6,305,727 27%
70+ 266,421 1.27% 816,956 4%
Indigent 790,078 3.77% 302,979 1%
Pregnant women 432,728 2%
Overall exempt 2,850,882 13.62% 7,929,537 34%
Total 3,934,424 18.79% 12,468,558 54%
% of registrants paying 28% 36%
Source: calculated based on data from annual health sector reviews for 2005 and 2008
Table 3: Is the Ghana NHIS a social health insurance scheme?
Key criteria How the NHIA performs
Is legislated by government and requires regular, compulsory 
contributions by specified population groups (usually initially covering 
those in formal employment and their dependants, and then gradually 
extending to other groups)
The NHIA meets these criteria to some extent, but rather than building 
up coverage of non-formal groups over time, it has built those in from 
the start, funded from large tax subsidies. Only around one-third of 
members have made any financial contribution. 70% of the funding is tax-
based.
Has an income-related contribution schedule (i.e. premiums are 
calculated according to ability to pay), which is uniform even if the SHI 
consists of a number of health funds serving as the financing 
intermediaries for the SHI
The NHIA payments are only income-related for the 3% of the 
population which are formal sector members. For informal members, 
there is a flat rate premium per person.
Has a standardized, prescribed minimum benefit package The NHIS does have a standardized, prescribed minimum benefit 
package
Source: criteria taken from [11]Page 5 of 13
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easy access to health facilities and therefore may not per-
ceive the benefits of membership. Analysis of data col-
lected in two districts in 2007 found that while higher
economic status affected enrolment (positively) [13],
renewal of membership was not affected by economic sta-
tus, but was affected by location – 88% of urban members
said that they were willing to renew, compared with 57%
of rural residents [14].
In addition, in the new insurance-financed system, money
follows infrastructure – as the regional director for Greater
Accra puts it in her annual report for 2008, a hospital with
a laboratory will tend to generate more income than a
health centre without one. There will therefore be a ten-
dency (as with IGF previously) for higher level facilities to
capture reimbursements disproportionately, and similarly
with areas (districts or regions) which have higher levels
of infrastructure. In this way, historical imbalances
between areas may be reinforced and perpetuated.
While the deterrent to recruiting 'indigents' has been
removed (collectors are now paid the same commission,
whether they recruit paying or exempt members), the def-
inition of 'indigent' in the 2003 Act is very restrictive.
Many district schemes have now asked community groups
to identify the poorest for enrolment, but it is not clear
how effective this strategy will be. The proportion of the
total population with NHIS cards for indigents has
dropped from 4% in 2005 to 1% for 2008 (Table 2). This
is very low compared with an estimated 28% living under
the poverty line, according to 2006 Ghana Living Stand-
ard Survey figures.
One of the equity concerns relating to the NHIS is how it
has affected the non-insured. When a new Diagnosis-
Related Group (DRG) tariff was introduced in 2008 it
increased 'cash and carry' prices as much as those paid by
the DMHIS. For the non-insured, who are commonly the
less well off, this will have increased existing financial bar-
riers to health care. Assessing to what extent the non-
insured have been 'squeezed out' of the market is not
straightforward, but at the fact that two-thirds of 'inter-
nally generated revenue' (IGF – income generated by facil-
ities from user fees and the NHIS) is now generated by the
NHIS (see below), while membership is 45% of the pop-
ulation, suggests that the non-insured are using fewer
services and/or less expensive services. Whether they are
using fewer services than they did prior to the tariff
increases would require more in-depth study, but it seems
intuitively likely, given rises in user fees.
As the NHIS extends towards full coverage, some of the
equity concerns will be reduced. In addition, the current
regional membership patterns (with high membership
levels in the north, less so in areas such as Greater Accra)
suggest that the rich in urban areas may be self-selecting
out of the scheme for private care (though this hypothesis
would need investigation).
Impact of NHIS on members
Financial protection
There has been little research to date on the impact of the
NHIS in relation to household care seeking and expendi-
tures, particularly as the NHIS has increased in scale.
However, one study has compared baseline data in two
districts, before the NHIS (in 2004) and after (in 2007)
[15]. Its findings suggest that there has been an increase in
access to formal care amongst members, as well as a sig-
nificant decrease in out-of-pocket expenditure. However,
there was no difference in use of maternal care (ANC,
deliveries or caesareans) between the intervention and
control group, which is an unexpected finding. In addi-
tion, the study showed that enrolment in the NHIS
remained pro-rich.
Reports of informal payments were rare in the years before
the NHIS, with user fee collection closely controlled at
health facility level [7]. In the past year, reports of infor-
mal payments to health workers have grown. Examples of
reported informal payments by clients include:
❍ Charging for services out-of-hours
❍ Asking patients to pay for drugs which are said not to
be in stock
❍ Asking patients to pay for 'better' drugs, said to be not
provided under the NHIS
One of the factors may be the increased workload for staff
resulting from the NHIS – they have experienced a growth
in work without any compensation (except for midwives,
who do get a small allowance per delivery, according to
key informants, at least in some areas). Consequently,
they may feel justified in charging small amounts for what
they see as 'extra' services. Another factor may be the
delays in reimbursement, discussed below.
There are no general data on how household out-of-
pocket payments have changed over the last few years in
Ghana, though a planned National Health Accounts
should illuminate this.
Utilisation of services
While there is no public information on trends in out-
patient (OPD) services by insured patients specifically,
OPD use for the population as a whole shows a marked
increase from 2005 onward, compared to stable (low) use
before (Figure 2). The timing and pattern correlates withPage 6 of 13
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has indeed increased service use. According to an ILO
paper of 2006, utilisation for the insured was then at
around 0.9 OPD per capita – almost twice the non-
insured (then at 0.49 visits per capita) [16]. It is interest-
ing to note however that overall admissions have been sta-
ble over the past few years, which is unexpected.
In 2009 the Network of Mutual Health Organisations esti-
mated an average of 1.4–1.5 visits per card holder per
year, indicating that there has been the expected growth in
service use by members.
Financial sustainability
The emergence of cash flow problems
In the first two years of operation, there was no evidence
of cash flow problems in the NHIS, as contributions had
built up in the two years prior to operation (from SSNIT
contributors) and membership numbers (and therefore
claims) were low. In 2008, however, some major cash
flow problems developed. As of the end of 2008, around
$34 million was owing to health facilities, according to
the Ministry of Health financial statement (almost all of
this due to unpaid NHIS claims). This was equivalent to
3–4 months' worth of total IGF.
Another symptom of the emerging problem was the
growth in payments to 'distressed schemes' (part of the
NHIA's reinsurance function). At the end of 2008, GHc
8.32 million was paid out by the NHIA under this budget
line (as against a budget of GHc 5 million for the year),
rising to just under GHc 30 million in the first quarter of
2009, according to a presentation made by the NHIA
Chief Executive in March 2009. This indicates both prob-
lems of budgeting and planning, and a growing gap
between subsidies to schemes and the costs which they
face. Although schemes can apply for 're-assurance', many
may be reluctant to do so, partly because of the adminis-
trative hurdles involved, but also because of the presumed
taint of 'mismanaging' the funds.
The DMHIS are heavily dependent on the subsidies they
receive from the NHIA, which provides some 80–90% of
their revenue. The original setting of the subsidy amount
per member (which has since been adjusted upward by a
small amount each year) was apparently based on the
premia used by the pre-existing mutual health organisa-
tions. However, these were offering very limited packages
at the time, so could not have provided an accurate basis
for such broad coverage as is offered by the NHIS. In 2008,
the fixed transfer per exempted member was GHc 14.
Overall figures for claims and expenditure are lacking to
assess the adequacy of this subsidy, but in the case of preg-
nant women, the NHIA tariff for ANC, normal facility
delivery and PNC at the lowest level of facility would cost
just over GHc 14. Any additional complication, illness
Trends in OPD and admissions, Ghana, 2001–8Figure 2
Trends in OPD and admissions, Ghana, 2001–8. Source: Annual sector review, 2008.
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therefore push the cost over the subsidy level.
Another symptom of the cash short-fall at the district level
is the fact that most schemes which used to up-front pay-
ments of 40% or so of claims to providers (while claims
were being checked) have stopped the practice in 2008.
Some scheme managers report that while they had surplus
to invest in 2007, there was none in 2008.
Underlying challenges to financial sustainability
Underlying the cash flow difficulties now emerging are
some fundamental design issues which threaten the long-
term sustainability of the NHIS. These are summarised in
Table 4.
While in a 'normal' insurance system, increased member-
ship would bring in increased income from premia, in the
NHIS, the income is largely de-coupled – 90–95%,
according to the CEO in 2008, coming from SSNIT and
the VAT levy. The bulk of its income will therefore grow
with national income rather than membership numbers.
GDP growth (6.2% in 2008) is below the rate of growth
of membership (from 36% in 2007 to 45% of valid card
holders in 2008). This means that the more successful the
NHIS (in terms of coverage), the greater the risk of finan-
cial difficulties.
In 2008 a new tariff structure was introduced by the
NHIA, based on a DRG system (paying per episode of
care, according to disease groups, but also differentiated
by level of care and sector). This replaced the previous
payment system which was based on fees for service.
Although financial data is not yet available from the NHIA
to analyse the overall impact of the new tariffs, scrutiny of
selected health facilities' claims shows an immediate
jump in NHIS claims, sometimes a doubling within the
month of the new tariff being introduced.
Drug costs are currently billed separately on top of the
fixed DRG payment per episode, and it is reported by the
NHIA that the number of drugs per prescription have
increased, from 4.5 in 2004 to 6 now, with some more
expensive drugs being particularly favoured by some doc-
tors.
Another common result of the introduction of DRG sys-
tems is 'tariff creep' – shifting to diagnoses which attract a
higher tariff – which is being reported by NHIA inform-
ants. ('We don't get simple malaria cases any more – all
malaria is complicated'.)
In addition to the increase in tariffs and increase in mem-
bers, there has been an increase in utilisation of services
by members, which is the expected result of any reduction
in financial barriers to care. While this is a positive devel-
opment (OPD per capita visits remain under the expected
norm), it is also something to monitor carefully, in terms
of the implications for cash flows and, ultimately, sustain-
ability. Increased utilisation of curative care is not self-evi-
dently positive and care patterns can be distorted by
provider interests and also unequal access by different
groups. In addition, improving the quality of care is criti-
cal to realising health gains from increased utilisation.
Table 4: Summary of challenges to financial sustainability in NHIS
Dimension Current challenges
Funding sources Majority of income grows with growth in consumption, not with membership.
Very low premia for informal sector in relation to cost of care.
Benefits package Benefits package comprises an estimated 95% of all treatments in Ghana, with no limit to consumption.
Coverage Large proportion of population is exempt and these categories continue to grow
Membership is growing and with a growing rate of utilisation by members
Payment systems Prices have risen with new DRG payment system
Drug costs additional – incentive to over-prescribe
Anecdotal evidence of 'tariff creep' and gaming by providers
Reported increase in fraudulent claims
Increasing role of private sector (increases access but also raises costs)
Cost-control No co-payments
Gate-keeping not effective – patients self-refer to secondary hospitals and tertiary ones use their polyclinics as an entry point 
into specialist care
Monitoring Poor monitoring and control systems within the NHIS, although a new IT system is being introduced which may improve the 
situationPage 8 of 13
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general issue in Ghana, not limited to care provided under
the NHIS, also raises prices, as it means people frequent
higher level facilities more, which results in higher reim-
bursement per episode.
An increase in accredited providers widens access, which
is positive, but also has an impact on the cash flow of the
NHIS. In 2008, there were 1,551 accredited private pro-
viders, providing one-third of all services reimbursed by
the NHIS, according to a recent report [17]. Given that the
tariff for private providers is higher (and consumers in
urban areas have no price disincentive to visiting them),
this is likely to be another driver of cost escalation.
There is anecdotal evidence of various types of fraud
(against schemes but also, some allege, by and with
schemes). It is not easy to assess their scale, not least
because some mis-billing reflects lack of understanding of
the new tariff. The shift from fee for service, which health
facilities are accustomed to, to a DRG-based payment sys-
tem is not simple. The payment is per illness episode, but
the definition of episodes, and the rules about return visits
(designed to control costs) are quite complex for provid-
ers to follow. In one region visited, an estimated 20–25%
of claims presented were rejected, for a variety of reasons.
Purchasing
Given that the NHIS is largely tax-funded, it may be
argued that its main value-added lies not so much in addi-
tional resource generation as in creating an independent
mechanism for purchasing services in a way which is more
responsive than the traditional budget channels. That
capacity may develop over time. At present, the NHIS
faces constraints in even managing claims effectively,
never mind acting as an active purchaser. Its information
systems are rudimentary, though there are hopes that a
new IT system will help with the transmission of more
useful management information from schemes to
national level. Currently the IT system is facing its own
teething problems.
As the NHIS is pushing up consumption of health care, it
is obviously critical that measures are put in place to
ensure that the health care provided is appropriate and
effective. As one key informant put it: 'We want good
health outcomes – not just to inject money!' This will
involve investment on the provider side – investment in
quality assurance systems, which are currently under-
funded – as well as the development of an accreditation
system, which has recently been piloted by the NHIA [18].
Overall impact on health system
The role of the NHIS has changed significantly over the
past four years. Its original intention was to replace user
fees and so reduce financial barriers to health care, ineq-
uity and health-related poverty. This is now changing,
with a greater proportion of health care being funded
through the NHIS channel. While user fees only consti-
tuted around 12–14% of the overall resource envelope in
the first half of the decade, the NHIS is now estimated to
contribute 41% of overall revenue (according to the
Medium Term Expenditure Framework for 2009).
'Internally generated funds' in Ghana, 2005–8: NHIS and 'cash and carry'Figure 3
'Internally generated funds' in Ghana, 2005–8: NHIS and 'cash and carry'. Source: [19].
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carry' IGF: only in 2008 did the cash and carry component
start to reduce (Figure 3).
Instead of merely covering some of the recurrent non-sal-
ary costs of services, as user fees used to, it is now gradu-
ally expanding to fund other functions. In the guidelines
for the 2009 budget, items 3 (service costs) and item 2
(administration) are either reduced or cut entirely for
facilities which generate income, and hospitals are
directed to set aside 10% of IGF revenue for replacement
of equipment and minor rehabilitation of infrastructure.
IGF revenues are also used to pay staff. The overall need to
control growth in 'personal emoluments' (wages and
allowances) may be circumvented by the fact that institu-
tions are increasingly able to hire 'casual' staff, paid from
IGF. The trend towards funding the full cost of curative
care from the NHIS poses a risk, if the management of the
NHIF is not sustainably managed.
Many regard the NHIS as additional funding, but the real-
ity is that its growth has coincided with a clear levelling off
(i.e. reduction in real terms) of the core government sub-
sidy to health (Figure 4). The NHIS is included in the sec-
tor budget, and what it adds is evidently adjusted for by
the Ministry of Finance. Looking at longer term trends, the
proportion of public spending allocation to health has
grown from 8.4% at the start of the first SWAp in 1997 to
hitting the Abuja target of 15% in 2005 (prior to the NHIS
start-up). Since then, the allocation to health, including
the NHIS funding, has remained around that level (the
proportion was 14.9% in 2008; the allocation for 2009 is
15%). The total annual expenditure on health per capita
(including government funds, donors funds, NHIS contri-
butions and user payments to public facilities) was $25 in
2006, dropping slightly to $23 in 2007 and 2008 (the
drop partly reflecting changes to the exchange rate).
The financial impact of the NHIS on providers is complex
to assess. On one hand, price and activity levels have
increased, all of which increase revenue and lower unit
costs. On the other hand, reimbursement delays obvi-
ously damage cash flow and non-payment causes longer
term debts (to suppliers, such as the medical stores and
others). At the facility level, how have the revenues from
the NHIS been used (from hospitals down to the lowest
levels – the CHPS compounds)? Anecdotally, some have
used them to upgrade facilities and pay for maintenance.
Others are sitting on balances, perhaps because it is hard
to get approval from district managers to release funds.
Some reports of overcrowding, particularly in OPD, have
been reported but it is not known if this is a general prob-
lem or specific to some facilities. It is important to look in
more detail at how facility activities have been affected.
The regions with higher membership are particularly
dependent on NHIS reimbursements – in Northern
region, for example, nearly 90% of IGF in 2008 came from
the NHIS. In one district hospital, visited at random, gov-
ernment 'core budget' funds provided 6% of total revenue
for 2008; programme funding 4% and IGF 90%.
Overall health sector funding, 2004–2008, by sourceFigure 4
Overall health sector funding, 2004–2008, by source. Source: MoH Financial Statements, 2004–2008.
Funding 2004 to 2008 by source
Ghana cedi millions (nominal)
-
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
600.00
700.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
NHIS transfers at national 
level to MoH
HIPC Fund
Financial Credits
MOH Programmes
Health Fund/Sector 
budget support
Interest/Other
Total IGF(user fees + NHIS)
Govt Ghana subsidy Page 10 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:20 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/20A separate concern is the balance between preventive and
curative services. At present, those facilities generating rev-
enue from the NHIS are becoming increasingly financially
independent, while funds for public health activities,
while not falling, are stagnant. This changes the power
balance between hospitals, in particular, and health man-
agers at district, regional and national levels. Ensuring that
this does not contribute to increased health sector frag-
mentation requires careful thought and action. While
there is some evidence that facility funds at the sub-district
level are benefiting the wider district (relieving the need
for district managers to pay for fuel for outreach activities
by the health centres, for example), there is no evidence of
any financial redistribution from hospitals to health
administrations.
The current payment system risks creating 'perverse incen-
tives' to provide more curative and less preventive health
care. In other countries, 'payment for performance' sys-
tems tend to incentivise public health activities. If the
NHIA remains a significant funding channel for health
care in Ghana, some thought might be given to modifying
it to cover preventive care. This would not only benefit the
health of Ghanaians but also save the NHIS money. This
was noted in a recent study, which estimated the cost sav-
ings which could be generated by including family plan-
ning in the NHIS benefits package (Banking on Health
2008). Clients currently face a small charge for family
planning commodities and services, which seems at odds
with the policy of providing free delivery care through the
NHIS.
Governance and accountability
Looking at the original Act and Legislative Instrument,
there was some ambiguity in the accountability arrange-
ments for the NHIS, which has led to a period of institu-
tional conflict. Some articles refer to the role of the
Minister – for example, in Article 2.2.h, it refers to the
NHIA as making 'proposals to the Minister for the formu-
lation of policies on health insurance', which implies that
the Minister exercises oversight. Others refer to the role of
Parliament, for example, in approving allocation of funds
(78.1.c). Others again reflect the role of the President, for
example, in appointing the Executive Secretary of the
NHIA (92.1). The Chief Executive has taken this to mean
that he is ultimately responsible to the President, rather
than to the Minister of Health, and cooperation and infor-
mation sharing between the NHIA and the MoH has not
been strong.
In addition, the corporate culture of the NHIA has not
been open until now, with routine data being treated as
confidential material. This has reinforced a sense of lack
of transparency, and of a fragmented sector, not working
together. Annual and financial reports have not been cir-
culated in a timely way. A business plan was developed
some years ago but has still not been shared. Very little
information on the situation of the DMHIS filters up to
the national level. There appears to be no concerted plan
for monitoring and evaluation.
In addition to issues of governance and transparency,
there are debates about the structure of the NHIS itself.
The NHIA is proposing some fundamental changes to the
way in which the NHIS works: it presented amendments
to LI 1809 to Cabinet in 2008, but these would now have
to be re-presented under the new government. The objec-
tive was to merge the district schemes. This offers advan-
tages in terms of creating a single risk pool and also
potential efficiencies in terms of processing claims in ten
regional centres (rather than 145 district schemes). Set
against that is the loss of local accountability and poten-
tial for local mobilisation which was a feature of the orig-
inal 2003 Act. This is a very important political decision
which should receive wider public discussion in Ghana.
Discussion
The NHIS is a very bold national experiment, which is
now, like the banking system, 'too big to fail'. It has
already undergone a number of evolutions and will
almost certainly embark on more. How can it be judged so
far in terms of its overall contribution? Given the ten-
dency of reforms to drift over time and to be influenced by
wider political and stakeholder interests, other analysts
have advocated benchmarking social health insurance
against its original objectives [11]. In the case of Ghana,
the original objectives were essentially political, but
focussed on removing financial barriers for households to
access health care. Against these objectives, it has per-
formed relatively well – covering a substantial proportion
of households in a relatively short period of time, and
reducing household expenditure, according to the one
impact evaluation conducted to date (though it should be
noted that this study only focussed on a small number of
areas and that its data collection did not extend into the
recent period in which facility reimbursements have been
delayed, which may have had a knock-on effect on house-
hold payments).
More generally, SHI typically has two main goals – to
increase revenues and to improve the equity and effi-
ciency of the health system [11]. In relation to these goals,
Ghana's achievements are less clear-cut. The increased
funding through the NHIS appears to have substituted for
other public revenue. In terms of equity, there remain pro-
rich biases in membership of the NHIS, and negative
impacts on non-members, who face higher payments for
services. NHIS members, meanwhile, enjoy the double
public subsidy of the use of the NHIL levy as well as ben-
efiting from increased access to prior public subsidies toPage 11 of 13
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the pro-rich bias of membership has to be compared with
previous patterns of access to care. There are few recent
benefits incidence studies for Ghana, but one conducted
in the early 1990s showed that public funding for hospi-
tals and in totality was weakly pro-rich but, at the health
centre level, use appeared to be proportional to sickness
across all groups [20]. The overall effect of the NHIS is
therefore likely to have exacerbated a previously weakly
pro-rich utilisation of public funds.
In relation to horizontal equity, the design of the NHIS is
positive, with equal contributions across the country, risk
pooling between schemes (through reinsurance) and the
offer of a standard package of care, although the ability to
physically access care will determine the extent to which
these benefits are realised. While geographical inequality
existed before the NHIS, it risks being exacerbated by it,
inasmuch as those living in proximity to facilities can, by
joining, reduce the financial barriers they faced and
increase their utilisation.
The evidence on efficiency is ambiguous too – while rising
utilisation could increase efficiency by reducing unit costs,
there are also efficiency losses through the additional rev-
enue collection costs (NHIL and premia), the NHIS over-
heads, the increase in supply-induced demand for NHIS
clients, the increased ability to self-refer to higher level
facilities, and the apparent shift in funding from public
health/preventive to curative activities (an area which
requires more in-depth analysis).
Another traditional argument for SHI is that it increases
the responsiveness of services [21], as members have a
stronger entitlement than mere tax-paying consumers.
There is no evidence yet that this is happening in Ghana,
though the efforts at establishing systems for accreditation
and complaints channels for clients are attempting to shift
the system in that direction. The NHIA is accountable to
Parliament, just as the Ministry of Health is. Its accounta-
bility to members is not very apparent and the plan to
merge the DMHIS will undermine whatever local
accountability systems exist at district level (these are very
variable in practice – strong in some areas but close to
non-existent in others).
With its heavy reliance on tax funding and its inclusion of
major population groups whether they have contributed
or not, the NHIS in many ways resembles a tax-funded
universal health care system more than a SHI one. The
main distinction is the third-party payment channel for
curative care. Whether the substantial transaction costs of
setting up this parallel system are justified (adding to the
plethora of agencies operating in the health sector in
Ghana) will depend on the extent to which the NHIS is
able to act as a cost-effective and responsive purchaser. As
noted, its capacity in this respect is currently weak. The
switch from traditional budget ceilings to payment per
curative episode also creates a strong incentive for cost
escalation, which threatens the overall financial sustaina-
bility of the NHIS. The current delays in reimbursement
are an early sign of the problem. Reforms will be needed
to square the circle of a broad and open-ended benefits
package, wide population coverage and limited funding.
Conclusion
Establishing a social health insurance system takes time –
countries like Germany have taken a century to reach uni-
versal coverage through this route. It is therefore early
days for the NHIS, which was only launched in 2005, and
further evolution is inevitable. However, it is important
that it is carefully monitored and challenges facing it
openly debated. The lessons from Ghana should also
inform other experiments in the region.
Some trade-offs will be necessary between the existing
wide benefits package with no co-payments and the laud-
able desire to reach universal coverage. The overall
resource envelope for health is likely to be stable rather
than increasing over the medium-term. The NHIS has not
leveraged additional resources for health care in Ghana
but has changed the funding channels. The jury is still out
on how that has affected equity and efficiency in the sys-
tem. In addition, there are pressing challenges to financial
sustainability which will require more cost control meas-
ures to be put in place. In the longer term, the investment
costs in the NHIS will only be justified if it is able to
increase the cost-effectiveness of purchasing and the
responsiveness of the system as a whole.
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